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This paper tests the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy 
opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote 
margins. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of fiscal illusion on the previous two 
dimensions. Empirical results, obtained with a sample of 68 countries from 1960 to 
2006, reveal that opportunistic measures of expenditures and revenues generate 
larger winning margins for the incumbent and that the opportunistic manipulation of 
fiscal policy instruments is larger when the current government is less likely to be re-
elected. Furthermore, fiscal illusion contributes to the entrenchment of incumbent 
policymakers in office and promotes opportunistic behaviour.  
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature on vote/popularity functions has shown that the economy 
influences the vote. Additionally, research on political business cycles (hereafter, 
PBC) has found evidence that politicians try to manipulate the economy, particularly 
fiscal policy instruments, in order to woo the electorate and gain reelection. However, 
these two issues have mostly been addressed independently.
1 A notable exception is 
Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) that proposes a new test of the rational political 
business cycle and implements it on a sample of Portuguese local governments. 
Their results show that opportunistic increases in expenditures lead to larger win-
margins for incumbent mayors, and that incumbents are more opportunistic when 
their win-margin is expected to be small.  
The present paper tests, on an international setting, the joint hypotheses that 
policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by 
rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. The test is implemented for 
national governments, using a sample of 68 countries and 40 years of data. We allow 
for opportunism to occur, not only in governments’ expenditures, but also on the 
revenue side. The empirical strategy also builds on the strategic debt models 
proposed by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabelini (1990), where 
the economy exhibits a deficit bias when incumbents anticipate being replaced in the 
next election by a new government with different objectives.   
Furthermore, we address the issue of transparency in fiscal policy by 
incorporating a measure of fiscal illusion in our regressions.
2 According to Buchanan 
(1967), politicians engage in tactics to produce fiscal illusion so that voters 
overestimate the benefits of public expenditures and underestimate the tax burden. 
More recently, Alt and Lassen (2006) argued that lack of transparency in fiscal policy 
encourages PBCs.  3 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review, 
and section 3 the empirical model. The data sources and the fiscal illusion index are 
described in section 4, and the empirical results are presented and discussed in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Research on electoral economics developed in the 1970’s with the seminal 
works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer (1971) for 
vote/popularity functions, and Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) for opportunistic 
and partisan business cycles. Since then, many papers have been written, but these 
two topics have mostly been analyzed independently. An exception in this first 
generation of papers is Frey and Schneider (1978). This study highlighted the 
importance of analyzing the interrelationship between the economy and the polity, by 
presenting estimations of popularity functions for the US president, along with 
government expenditure reaction functions that took into account a re-election motive 
influenced by the popularity of the incumbent.  
The rational expectations revolution brought new challenges to the literature, 
since rational voters could not be systematically fooled one election after the other by 
opportunistic politicians. New models were developed where a PBC could result from 
asymmetries of information between policymakers and voters. In rational 
opportunistic models, such as Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), 
incumbents signal their competence to the electorate by manipulating budgetary 
items. In the former, governments increase distortionary taxes before elections in 
order to increase expenditures, and/or decrease non-distortionary taxes that are 
immediately visible by the electorate. Rogoff (1990) emphasizes the composition of 
expenditure items: before elections, governments increase expenditures that are 4 
 
immediately visible by the electorate, as opposed to those that only become visible 
after the election. In Alesina’s (1987) model, it is the uncertainty about the ideology of 
the party that will win the balloting that justifies the appearance of rational partisan 
cycles.  
  Regarding the empirical literature, the first generation of papers testing 
political business cycles made use of national-level data on elections and real 
macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment and inflation. With the introduction 
of rational expectations in the models, empirical research re-focused the analysis to 
economic policy instruments, particularly those of fiscal policy. Tests performed on 
macroeconomic outcomes generally fail to provide evidence of PBCs,
3 but more 
favorable evidence is found for fiscal policy outcomes. Although the number of 
papers testing PBC is extensive, the micro incentives for political business cycles 
have received insufficient attention, as pointed out by Willett and Keil (2004: 414) in 
their survey of PBCs.  
We intend to build on the PBC literature by estimating voting functions and 
the determinants of opportunistic policies as a system of equations, using a sample 
of OECD countries over 40 years. To our knowledge, only Aidt, Veiga and Veiga 
(2010) have presented joint estimations of voting functions and policy reaction 
functions, but their research deals with local governments for a specific country 
(Portugal). Akhmedov and Zhurasvskaya (2004) and Drazen and Eslava (2010), also 
dealing with local governments (in Russia and Colombia respectively), have 
estimated voting functions and tested for opportunistic cycles in fiscal policy, but did 
not analyze what drives the opportunistic manipulation. 
  Furthermore, we address an issue that has been highlighted by the most 
recent contributions on the topic - the information citizens have to detect and punish 
opportunistic policies. A consensus seems to have been reached that electoral 5 
 
budgetary policies are stronger in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006), 
where voters are inexperienced with electoral politics (Brender and Drazen, 2005; 
Brender, 2003; Akhmedov and Zhurasvskaya, 2004), politicians are less credible 
(Keefer and Razvan, 2008), and fiscal policy is less transparent (Alt and Lassen, 
2006). We address this issue in our research by analysing the influence of fiscal 
illusion on electoral results and on opportunistic practices. The hypothesis of fiscal 
illusion was first introduced by Puviani (1903) but came into the mainstream of 
economic research with Buchanan (1967). In countries where fiscal illusion is 
stronger, voters do not take into account the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint. They tend to overestimate the benefits of recent policies and 
underestimate the resulting future fiscal burden. Therefore, fiscal illusion increases 
the popularity of the incumbent politician and contributes to the perpetuation of the 
ruling class. Edelman (2001) and Caplan (2007) also suggest that a reason for 
political illusion is political opportunism because politicians want to maximize the 
probability of success of their opportunistic practices. According to these authors, 
illusions strengthen the effects on voters of benefits gained from opportunistic 
increases in expenditures and reductions in taxation. Edelman (2001) discusses the 
ways in which this information asymmetry is supported by many sources of political 
illusion. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on strategic debt models of 
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina  and Tabellini (1990). In these models 
policymakers with different preferences alternate in office and use government debt 
to influence the choices of their successors. According to Persson and Svensson 
(1989) the conservative government, i.e. one which favors lower public expenditures, 
collects fewer taxes and leaves more public debt than what its successor would 
prefer, when it anticipates that it will be succeeded by a liberal government.  In 6 
 
Alesina and Tabellini’s model, policymakers disagree on the composition of public 
spending rather than the level, and there is a deficit bias regardless of which party is 
in office. In both cases governments try to influence the choices of their successors 
by manipulating the level of debt that they leave when they depart office. The 
strength of the incentive depends on the expected probability of defeat. Since we do 
not have data on perceived electoral results from polls for all the countries and all 
time periods, and instead of working with post election results as in Petterson-Lidbom 
(2001), we use the estimated outcome of the voting function as a proxy for the 
expected probability of re-election. Since we estimated a system of equations, we are 
also able to implement Persson and Svensson (1989)’s suggestion (page 342) to test 
if the probability of being reelected depends upon the policy pursued.  
 
3. The empirical model 
Based on the theoretical arguments presented in the previous section, we expect 
incumbents to behave more opportunistically when they are more uncertain of 
winning the election, and we expect opportunistic policies to improve governments’ 
electoral prospects. The empirical model thus tests for the reciprocal influence of 
opportunistic fiscal policies and the win-margin of incumbents, taking into account the 
degree of fiscal illusion existent in the country, and other factors that may influence 
the political business cycle. Our system of two simultaneous equations can be 
described as follows: 
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Where i=1,…,68 identifies the country, and t the legislative election year between 
1960 and 2006. Both equations include country fixed effects ( i ν  and  i τ ) and time 
fixed effects ( t δ and t ϑ ). The β1 to βm+1 and α1 to αm+1 represent parameters to be 
estimated, and  it ε  and  it μ the error terms. 
In the first equation (Eq. 1), the dependent variable is the margin of victory 
obtained by the main incumbent party in legislative elections (MVit). We measure the 
win-margin by the difference between the log of the vote share of the most voted 
party and the log of the vote share or the largest opposition party. In the second 
equation (Eq. 2), the dependent variable is a measure of the opportunistic electoral 
distortion in the fiscal aggregate (ODit). This is proxied by the difference in logs of the 
share of public expenditures/revenues of GDP in the electoral year and the share 
over the entire term of office.  
We expect the opportunistic distortion to have a positive impact ( 0 1 > β ) on 
the margin of victory of the incumbent when it is implemented through public 
expenditures, but to have a negative effect when revenues are manipulated. 
According to the literature on electoral opportunism and the use of debt as a strategic 
variable, the lower is the expected win-margin, the larger is the incumbents’ incentive 
to generate a positive (negative) distortion in public expenditures (revenues). That is, 
we expect a negative sign (α1 < 0) for the estimated coefficient associated with the 
margin of victory when estimating equation 1 for expenditures, and a positive sign 
when estimating equation 1 for revenues (α1 > 0). 
Regarding the influence of fiscal illusion on the margin of victory, we expect a 
positive sign for the estimated βm+1 coefficient. According to Puviani (1903) fiscal 
illusion leads to the perpetuation of incumbents in power, and therefore, to higher 
expected win-margins. Additionally, the manipulation of fiscal variables to win 8 
 
elections and condition the fiscal stances of the next government is expected to be 
larger in environments where fiscal illusion is stronger (Mourão, 2007). That is, a 
positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with αn+1 in the case 
of public expenditures, and a negative one for public revenues.  
Matrix X in equation 1 comprises variables that may influence the electoral 
prospects, and that are present in most studies of vote functions for panels of 
countries.
4 In order to test if governments are held responsible for the evolution of the 
economy, the unemployment rate (unemploymentit) and the inflation rate (inflationit) 
were included as explanatory variables. The win-margin from the previous election 
captures persistency in voting behavior. To measure the costs of ruling, we include 
the consecutive number of years the party has been in office (years in incumbencyit), 
and a dummy for parties in office for two or more consecutive terms (re-electionit). 
The degree of government fractionalization (government fractionalizationit) measures 
the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government 
parties will be of different parties. Finally, a dummy for OECD countries (OECDit) 
should capture differences in institutions that are likely to influence electoral results. 
All variables were measured in logarithms, except for the index of government 
fractionalization and the number of years in office. 
In equation 2, column Y includes other variables that may help us understand 
cross-country differences as well as inter-temporal changes in the dimension of 
political opportunism. Following Wildavsky (1964), who suggested that, to succeed in 
signaling competence, governments need higher deviations in budget aggregates as 
budget aggregates increase, we expect the log of term average values for public 
expenditures (or for public revenues) as shares of GDP (public exp/rev shareit) to 
positively influence fiscal opportunism. Parties which stay office longer in (years in 
incumbencyit) and run for re-election (re-electionit) are expected to generate a larger 9 
 
distortion (Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2010). A dummy for the right-wing party in 
incumbency (right-wingit) is also included to test if ideology matters. Although most 
studies do not take government’s partisan orientation into account when investigating 
the degree of political opportunism, Veiga and Veiga (2007) found that right-wing 
Portuguese mayors to be less opportunistic than left-wing parties; and, Brug et al. 
(2007) argued that left-wing governments tend to reduce unemployment through 
more opportunist policies than right-wing governments, which are more concerned 
with inflation. The log of the proportion of people over age 65 was included to test for 
the findings of Simon (1985) and Binstock (2006), who demonstrated that older 
electors are more reactive to opportunist practices. A dummy for OECD countries 
and the log of real GDP per capita were also considered as proxies for the level of 
development of the country and maturity of institutions. Previous studies, namely Shi 
and Svensson (2006), have found opportunism to be stronger in developing 
countries. 
 
4. Data sources and the fiscal illusion index 
Our panel of data covers 68 democracies
5 from 1960 to 2006. The main sources of 
data were Brender and Drazen (2005), the Database of Political Institutions (2008), 
and International Financial Statistics (2006). 
  The Brender and Drazen (2005) database, available at http://www.tau.ac.il/ 
~drazen, covers 68 countries from 1960 to 2001. The database was updated through 
2006 for three items: (1) the percentage of elderly population with data from the 
World Development Indicators (2006); and (2) the shares of public revenue / 
expenditures in GDP, and (3) real GDP per capita with data from the International 
Financial Statistics (2006) of the International Monetary Fund. The Database of 
Political Institutions (2008) provided data to create the win-margin variable, the 10 
 
number of years in office of the most voted party, the dummy for re-election, and the 
fractionalization of the government. Inflation and unemployment rates were extracted 
from the International Financial Statistics (2006). The index of fiscal illusion was 
obtained from Mourão (2008), which provides a full description of the variables 
included in the index, and the methodology used in its construction.
6 
  Table 1 specifies the sources of data for each variable used in the paper and 
presents the descriptive statistics. 
<Table 1> 
 
5. Empirical results 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show estimation results for the system of equations described 
above using alternative specifications and econometric methods. Tests were 
implemented for fiscal opportunism on expenditures (table 2) and revenues (table 3). 
Then, we tested the hypothesis of identical coefficients for OECD and non-OECD 
countries (table 4). In all tables, standard errors are shown in parentheses, and the 
adjusted R-squared and the numbers of observations are reported at the bottom of 
the tables. The first two columns of tables 2 and 3, and all columns of table 4, report 
estimation results using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The set of 
instrumental variables of each equation includes all exogenous right-hand side 
variables of both equations, including country and time dummies. To check the 
robustness of the results, the system of equations was estimated by alternative 
econometric methods, namely Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). 
<Table 2> 
Results, presented in table 2, validate our predictions that the manipulation of 
public expenditures in electoral years influences the win-margin of the main party in 11 
 
office, and that incumbents who expect lower win-margins generate larger 
distortions. A one percent increase in public expenditures to GDP relative to the term 
average increases the win-margin by around 0.17% (table 2, column 1). This effect is 
particularly relevant if we take into account that, on average, the most voted party 
wins elections by only 0.89 percentage points
7 relative to the second party. On the 
other hand, a one percent increase in the expected margin of victory reduces the 
distortive expansionary effect in expenditure by 0.07%. 
  Analyzing the determinants of the win-margin in detail (first part of column 1 in 
tables 2) we conclude that governing parties are held responsible for economic 
conditions in the country, as increases in unemployment and inflation reduce their 
electoral prospectus. In terms of magnitude, it is worth noting that inflation exerts a 
bigger influence than unemployment, as the estimated coefficient associated with it is 
significantly higher.
8 There is evidence that parties who won by a larger margin in the 
previous election obtain better electoral results in the next balloting. This result 
confirms the persistence of votes over time, which can be due to ideology, among 
other factors. Results also suggest the existence of costs of ruling since the number 
of years in incumbency reduces the electoral prospects, and parties that win 
elections for two or more consecutive terms of office obtain fewer votes.   
Furthermore, more fractionalized governments seem to have lower winning-margins, 
and the same occurs in OECD countries relative to all 68 countries included in the 
sample. 
  Regarding the second part of table 2, which examines the determinants of 
fiscal manipulation in expenditures during electoral years, there is evidence of larger 
fiscal distortions when the share of public expenditures as a percentage of GDP is 
already large, and for governments that stay longer in office. Both the re-election 
dummy and the number of years in office are positive and statistically significant. This 12 
 
is not surprising if we take into account that incumbents may know there are costs 
associated to ruling, and therefore, their fear to lose the next balloting increases as 
time in office goes by. The lower the expected win-margin the larger the incentive to 
loosen fiscal policy, either to woo the electorate and win the election, or to 
compromise the choices of the next government. Partisan differences do not seem to 
influence distortions in expenditures, as the dummy identifying right wing 
governments turned out not to be statistically significant. There is weak evidence that 
when the percentage of elderly population is large, distortions in expenditures are 
more pronounced, and results strongly support that they are smaller in OECD 
countries than for the entire sample. These last two findings suggest that issues 
related to information and the quality of institutions may influence the behavior of 
politicians. 
The second column of table 2 reports empirical results for the estimations 
including the index of fiscal illusion as an explanatory variable in both equations of 
the system. There is strong evidence that when fiscal illusion is higher, incumbent 
parties win elections by a larger margin, and therefore, stay longer in office. A one 
percent increase in the index of fiscal illusion increases the winning margin by around 
0.5% percent. Furthermore, the fiscal illusion index turned out to be highly statistically 
significant in the second equation, suggesting that fiscal illusion promotes the use of 
public expenditures as a tool to win elections or compromise the budgetary options of 
the next government. A one percent increase in the index increases the distortion in 
public expenditures by 0.4%. The influence of the remaining variables stays basically 
the same, with the exception that the re-election dummy that is no longer statistically 
significant. 
To test the robustness of the results, the system of simultaneous equations 
was also estimated by two alternative econometric methods: the three stage least 13 
 
squares (3SLS) and the full information maximum likelihood (FIML). Results, 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 2, are essentially the same as those obtained 
when using the GMM method. It is worth mentioning that the GMM estimator is more 
robust than FIML because GMM does not require additional information related to 
disturbances. The GMM is based on the assumption that disturbances in the 
equations are not correlated with the set of instrumental variables. With a weighting 
matrix used in the criterion function, GMM is even more robust than 3SLS in 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Wooldridge 2002; Hsiao 
2002).  
As an additional robustness test, we used an alternative measure for the win-
margin consisting on the (log) ratio between the vote share of the most voted party 
and the sum of votes shares of all the other parties. Empirical results obtained for this 
alternative variable
9 do not differ significantly from those reported here. 
We then proceeded by performing the estimations of the system of equations 
using public revenues instead of public expenditures as the fiscal policy variable 
(Table 3). Results for equation 1 (reported in the first part of the table), reveal that 
reductions in public revenues in electoral years relative to the term average increase 
the electoral chances of incumbents: a one percent reduction increases the win-
margin by around 0.38%. It is important to realize that this effect is considerably 
larger than the one obtained for expenditures (0.17%). Regarding the remaining 
variables included in the vote-functions, their impact on the win-margin is basically 
the same as in the previous table.  
<Table 3> 
Estimation results for equation 2 (second part of table 3) suggest that higher 
expected win-margins decrease politicians’ incentive to manipulate public revenues 
in electoral years: a one percent increase in the win-margin increases the dependent 14 
 
variable (the percentage deviation of the share of public revenues to GDP in electoral 
years relative to the term average of the variable) by 0.04%. The share of public 
revenues in GDP has a positive effect on the electoral distortion in revenues, that is, 
the larger they are the less public revenues in balloting years are below their term 
average. This is probably due to a scale effect. Results for expenditures (Table 2) 
suggest that when the public sector is bigger, deviations of public expenditures from 
term averages in electoral moments also tend to be large. Since a large share of 
public expenditures on GDP is usually associated with a higher weight of public 
revenues, it is comprehensible that if expenditures are increased in electoral years 
revenues cannot be manipulated as much, otherwise this behavior would generate a 
very large deficit. Another interesting result is the positive sign of the estimated 
coefficient associated with years in incumbency, as in Table 2  for expenditures. 
Thus, there is evidence that less experienced politicians tend to use revenues as 
their strategic variable, while those with more experience favor expenditures. Results 
for the remaining variables are basically the same as for expenditures, in terms of 
significance and expected sign of the estimated coefficient, except for the real GDP 
per capita that now turns out to be statistically significant. In countries where real 
GDP per capita is higher the manipulation of public revenues for strategic electoral 
purposes seems to be smaller. This result corroborates the one obtained for the 
dummy identifying OECD countries.  
As for fiscal illusion, it continues to contribute to the perpetuation of politicians 
in office (the estimated coefficient associated with the index is positive and 
statistically significant in equation 1), and to induce the strategic use of fiscal policy 
instruments (in this case, revenues) as a tool to win elections and restrain the 
budgetary options of the next government. The results obtained for estimations using 
3SLS and FIML are similar to those generated by GMM. 15 
 
Given that the dummy for OECD countries is statistically significant in all 
specifications of Tables 2 and 3, we run separate regressions for OECD and non-
OECD countries. This procedure is line with Brender and Drazen (2007), and Alt and 
Lassen (2006), who suggested splitting the samples according to the level of 
development of the countries and the maturity of democracy. As can be seen from 
Table 4, opportunistic distortions in fiscal variables have a larger electoral reward, 
that is, increase the win-margin of incumbents more in non-OECD countries than in 
OECD countries, particularly when public expenditures are used as the political 
tool.
10 On the other hand, there is not much difference between OECD and non-
OECD countries regarding the impact of expected electoral results on opportunistic 
distortions in public revenues, although for expenditures the impact is larger in OECD 
countries.  
<Table 4> 
Fiscal illusion promotes higher win-margins in both cases, but the impact is 
larger in non OECD countries where the institutions are less mature.
11 There is also 
evidence that our measures for opportunist distortions are more influenced by fiscal 
illusion in non-OECD countries.
12 Regarding the economic variables, it is also worth 
noticing that unemployment exerts a bigger influence on the win-margin in elections   
occurring in non-OECD countries, while voters from OECD countries are more 
sensitive to inflation. Re-elected parties win by smaller margins in non-OECD 
countries and government fractionalization seems to exert a bigger influence on 
electoral results in OECD countries.
13 It is also worth noticing that when we split the 
sample, the dummy for right-wing governments now turns out to be statistically 
significant in the four regressions of table 4, suggesting that right-wing parties are 
less inclined to manipulate fiscal policy instruments with political purposes. This 
result is in accordance with Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2010) and Veiga and Veiga 16 
 
(2007), who found that in Portugal, right-wing mayors behave less opportunistically 
than left-wing ones.  For the other variables, empirical results remain essentially the 




The innovation of this paper is to address the determinants of fiscal policy choices in 
electoral years, in particular whether fear to be removed from office induces 
increases in expenditures and reductions in public revenues. In order to do so, we 
estimate a system of equations where vote expectations explain changes in fiscal 
policy variables in electoral years, and where these changes influence electoral 
results. The analysis also takes into account the economic, political and institutional 
situation of the country. This research is implemented using a large sample covering 
68 countries and legislative election years from 1960 to 2006.  
  Empirical results reveal that expectations of getting voted out of office lead 
governments to increase expenditures and reduce revenues in electoral years, in 
accordance with opportunistic budgetary models (Rogoff and Sibert 1988) and 
strategic debt models (Persson and Svensson 1998; Alesina and Tabellini 1990). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that strategic manipulation of fiscal variables 
generates votes for the incumbent. 
  Additionally, we find that higher levels of fiscal illusion promote the strategic 
use of budgetary items for political purposes and larger win-margins for the most 
voted party, contributing to the perpetuation of politicians in power (Puviani 1903; 
Buchanan 1967).  By generating a wrong perception of government budget 
aggregates from the voters’ and taxpayers’ perspectives, fiscal illusion erodes the 
quality of democracy in at least two ways. On one hand, by creating a favorable 
environment for political opportunism, it increases rent-seeking behavior, political 17 
 
corruption, and distrust between voters and elected agents. On the other hand, by 
perpetuating politicians in power, it reduces political competition, and prevents the 
renewal of the ruling class. In OECD countries win-margins are lower and the degree 
of fiscal manipulation is also less pronounced. For public revenues, increases in real 
GDP are also associated with less political manipulation of the budgetary item.  
  There is also evidence that voters hold politicians accountable for the 
economic situation of the country, and that OECD voters are more sensitive to 
inflation while non-OECD voters react more to unemployment. Time spent in office 
lowers the margin of victory in the next election, and more fractionalized 
governments achieve worse electoral results. Larger public sectors and years in 
incumbency promote the strategic use of expenditures for political purposes, but 
reduce this behavior in revenues. Re-elected politicians are more opportunistic, and 





Appendix – The Fiscal Illusion Index 
Data for the fiscal illusion Index was obtained from Mourão (2008), who empirically 
evaluated the extension of fiscal illusion in 68 democracies since 1960. The index 
was constructed taking into consideration multiple dimensions that may influence 
fiscal illusion, including the perspectives of those who exert public power and of 
those who are ruled. 
  After identifying the theoretical framework, twenty-six variables were chosen 
and included in the index computation. Table A.1 presents a list of the variables 
grouped according to the dimension of fiscal illusion they are associated with. After 
normalizing the variables, the method chosen to explain the variance of the observed 
data through a few linear combinations of the original data was a specific technique 
belonging to the group of the Multivariate Analysis—the Multiway Principal 
Components Analysis (MPCA). Then, each normalized variable with a significant 
factor loading (greater than 0.7) had a weight equal to the square of the factor 
loading divided by the explained variation by factor. At the end, each intermediate 
composite indicator had a weight equal to its proportion of the variance as explained 
by all of the factors.  
<Table A.1> 
  The final value given to each country-year observation was re-scaled using 
the percentile rank and now considered all weighted values. The index obtained 
reveal that fiscal illusion varies greatly around the world, and across time. Austria, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand have the lowest values, while Mali, 
Pakistan, Russia, and Sri Lanka have the highest average values over the time 
spam. There are considerable changes over time: between 1980 and 1995, there 
was a significant decrease in the average value of the index across countries, and 
after 1995, the index remained stable in most countries. 19 
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1 See Drazen (2000) and Mueller (2003) for surveys on economic performance and political 
success. 
2 Puviani (1903) pioneered the literature on political illusion, understood as practices adopted 
by politicians to deceive voters and perpetuate the power of the ruling class. According to 
Puviani, fiscal illusion is the most important form of political illusion. 
3 Hibbs (1977), McCallum (1978), Paldam (1979), Beck (1982) and Franzese (2002). 
4 See Chappell and Veiga (2000), among others. Paldam (2004) presents a survey on vote 
and popularity functions. 
5 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
6 Refer to the appendix for a brief explanation. 
7 Table 1 shows that the mean of the Win-margin is equal to -0,116. The anti-log of -0.116 
equals 0.89 percentage points. 
8 Therefore, the measures of opportunism have influence above and beyond their effects on 
economic conditions suggesting that opportunism is of the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) variety 
and not so much of the Nordhaus (1975) type. 20 
 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Available from the authors upon request. 
10 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 10% significance 
level. 
11 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 5% significance 
level. 
12 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 5% significance 
level. 
13 A Wald-test allows us to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 1% significance 
level. 
14 Results for OECD and non-OECD countries using 3SLS and FIML are available from the 
authors upon request, and they are very similar to those obtained by the GMM. 21 
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Table A.1 Dimensions and variables included in the fiscal illusion index 
Dimensions        Variables 
Herfindahl Index of Public Revenues 
Percentage of taxes on goods and services in total taxes revenues 
Composition of Public 
Revenues 
Ratio between indirect and direct taxes revenues 
Percentage of Public Debt in the Gross National Income  Composition of Public 
Debt  
Percentage of short-term public debt in the national public debt 
Percentage of taxes on transfers, on inheritances and gifts in total taxes 
revenues 
Relevance of   certain 
revenue sources 
Percentage of taxes on corporate profits in total taxes revenues 
Number of governmental 
Ministries 
Size of cabinets 
Percentage of invalid votes in parliamentary elections  Immaturity level of the 
democracies 
International country risk 
M2 (annual growth rates),  Effectiveness of public 
accounts (considering 
Money creation, inflation 
on rates and public debt) 
Real Public Budget, according to Forte (2004) 
Government confidence (in public polls)  Governmental rent-
seeking 
Percentage of public employees in 
the active population 
Composition of Public 
Capital outlays 
Percentage of expenditures on capital transfers in the total expenditures
Openness of the economy  Relevance of trade taxes 
Percentage of trade taxes in total taxes revenues 
Number of nonprofit organizations per million of people 
Average value of radio receptors, tv sets and newspapers per capita 
Number of governmental checks and balances 
Parliamentary power in the Democracy 
Percentage of education expenditures in the total expenditures 





Percentage of answers stating ‘economic growth’ as the most important 
national issue 
Herfindahl Index of Public Expenditures  Public expenditures 
manipulation 
Percentage of capital and current transfers in the total expenditures 
 26 
 
Table 1. Sources of data and descriptive statistics: electoral years, 1960-2006 




























































 Real GDP 






Observations 235  243 231  302  275  230 230  230  230  230  230  230  230  230 
Maximum  3.912  35  1  1  4.021 3.045  1  4.228  0.379  4.039 0.476 2.996  10.821  -0,373 
Minimum  -1,759  1  0  0  0.211 -0,069  0.007  2.012  -0,492  1.953 -0,559 0.693 5.613  -1,361 





Stand.  Deviation  0.678 5.230  0.387  0.492  1.313 0.191  0.218  0.437  0.089  0.454 0.092 0.617 1.081  0.180 
                             
Observations 157  159 157  153  153  153 155  159  159  158  159  154  159  160 
Maximum  1.078  15  1  1  3.998 0.693  1  3.989  0.371  3.914 0.236 2.833  10.057  -0,507 
Minimum  -1,601  1  0  0  0.211 -0,011  0.109  2.012  -0,492  2.051 -0,559 0.693 5.613  -1,115 








Stand.  Deviation  0.497 2.701  0.417  0.499  1.112 0.092  0.121  0.404  0.075  0.413 0.072 0.542 0.963  0.124 
                             
Observations 106  112 108  100  101  108 111  106  112  103  105  110  107  109 
Maximum  3.912  35  1  1  4.021 3.045  1  4.228  0.379  4.039 0.476 2.996  10.821  -0,373 
Minimum  -1,759  1  0  0  0.234 -0,069  0.007  2.175  -0,307  1.953 -0,472 1.262 7.279  -1,361 








Stand.  Deviation  0.803  5.121 0.357  0.479  1.4711 0.258 0.189  0.434  0.101  0.444  0.109  0.294  0.738  0.164 
Legend: DPI: Database of Political Institutions (2008), IFS: International Financial Statistics (2006), B&D(2005): Brender and Drazen (2005) 27 
 
Table 2. Win-margin and distortions in public expenditures 
   GMM 1  GMM 2  3SLS  FIML 
 Equation 1  Win-Margin  Win-Margin  Win-Margin  Win-Margin 
0,167 a  0,151 a  0,144 a  0,148 a 
Distortion in expenditures  (0,056) (0,060)  (0,057)  (0,059) 
-0,006 b  -0,008 b  -0,008 b  -0,008 b 
Unemployment  (0,003) (0,004)  (0,003)  (0,003) 
-0,355 b  -0,386 b  -0,368 b  -0,379 b 
Inflation  (0,178) (0,188)  (0,179)  (0,179) 
0,527 a  0,555 a  0,529 a   0,545 a  Win-Margin (previous 
election)  (0,077) (0,080)  (0,076)  (0,078) 
-0,010 a  -0,012 a  -0,011 a  -0,011 a 
Years in incumbency  (0,004) (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004) 
-0,177 b  -0,160 c  -0,152 c  -0,157 c 
Re-election  (0,078) (0,081)  (0,077)  (0,079) 
-1,317 a  -1,173 a  -1,117 a  -1,151 a  Government 
fractionalization  (0,379) (0,396)  (0,377)  (0,388) 
-0,095 a  -0,098 a  -0,093 a  -0,096 a 
OECD  (0,032) (0,035)  (0,033)  (0,033) 
   0,489 a  0,466 b  0,480 b 
Fiscal illusion index     (0,151)  (0,195)  (0,201) 
Adjusted R2  0.534  0.57  0.551  0.550 










-0,071 a  -0,078 a  -0,075 a  -0,077 a 
Win-margin  (0,021) (0,023)  (0,022)  (0,022) 
0,066 a  0,069 a  0,066 a  0,067 a 
Public expenditures share  (0,018) (0,019)  (0,018)  (0,018) 
0,011 c  0,010 c  0,010 c  0,010 c 
Years in incumbency  (0,006) (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,006) 
0,011  b 0.011 0.003 0.003 
Re-election  (0,005) (0,010)  (0,017)  (0,017) 
-0,018 -0,021  -0,019  -0,019 
Right-wing  (0,012) (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,012) 
0,005 c  0,004 c  0,004 b  0,004 b  % population over 65 
years-old  (0,002) (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002) 
OECD  -0,013 a  -0,015 a  -0,014 a  -0,014 a 
 (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004) 
0.007  0.008 0.008 0.008 
Real GDP per capita  (0,008) (0,008)  (0,008)  (0,008) 
   0,414 a  0,398 a  0,406 a 
Fiscal illusion index     (0,104)  (0,100)  (0,102) 
Adjusted  R2  0.334  0.321 0.358 0.353 
Number of observations  220  220  220  220 
Notes: Significance level: 1% (a); 5% (b); 10% (c). Standard errors between parentheses. System of simultaneous 
equations estimated by the method at the top of the column. Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables  for country and time specific effects. 28 
 
Table 3. Win-margin and distortions in public revenues 
   GMM 1  GMM 2  3SLS  FIML 
 Equation 1  Win-Margin  Win-Margin  Win-Margin  Win-Margin 
-0,383 a  -0,392 a  -0,377 a  -0,385 a 
Distortion in revenues  (0,114) (0,115) (0,111)  (0,113) 
-0,008 b  -0,008 b  -0,008 b  -0,008 b 
Unemployment  (0,003) (0,003) (0,003)  (0,003) 
-0,329  -0,329 c  -0,316 c  -0,322 c 
Inflation  (0,256) (0,197) (0,189)  (0,193) 
0,525 a  0,524 a  0,504 a  0,514 a  Win-Margin (previous 
election)  (0,076) (0,076) (0,073)  (0,074) 
-0,013 a  -0,012 a  -0,012 a  -0,012 a 
Years in incumbency  (0,004) (0,004) (0,004)  (0,004) 
-0,171 b  -0,171 b  -0,163 b  -0,167 b 
Re-election  (0,079) (0,079) (0,076)  (0,078) 
-1,119 a  -1,211 a  -1,164 a  -1,187 a  Government 
fractionalization  (0,372) (0,382) (0,367)  (0,374) 
-0,096 a  -0,095 a  -0,091 a  -0,093 a 
OECD  (0,034) (0,035) (0,034)  (0,035) 
   0,501 a  0,481 a  0,491 a 
Fiscal illusion index     (0,151)  (0,145)  (0,148) 
Adjusted R2  0.521  0.567  0.545  0.565 
Number of observations  228  228  228  228 









0,037 a  0,036 a  0,034 a  0,035 a 
Win-margin  (0,012) (0,012) (0,011)  (0,011) 
0,086 a  0,085 a  0,081 a  0,083 a 
Public revenues share  (0,019) (0,018) (0,017)  (0,018) 
0,012 c  0,012 c  0,011 c  0,011 c 
Years in incumbency  (0,007) (0,006) (0,006)  (0,006) 
-0,033 c  -0,034 c  -0,032 c  -0,033 c 
Re-election  (0,017) (0,017) (0,016)  (0,016) 
-0,018 -0.019 -0,018  -0,019 
right-wing  -0.014 (0,013) (0,012) (0,012) 
-0,003 c  -0,003 c  -0,003 c  -0,003 c  % population over 65 
years-old  (0,002) (0,002) (0,002)  (0,002) 
OECD  0,011 a  0,012 a  0,011 a  0,011 a 
 (0,003)  (0,003)  (0,003)  (0,003) 
0,036 b  0,037 b  0,035 b  0,036 b 
Real GDP per capita  (0,015) (0,016) (0,015)  (0,015) 
   -0,222 b  -0,211 b  -0,217 b 
Fiscal illusion index     (0,098)  (0,093)  (0,096) 
Adjusted R2  0.163  0.194  0.173  0.184 
Number of observations  228  228  228  228 
Notes: Significance level: 1% (a); 5% (b); 10% (c). Standard errors between parentheses. System of simultaneous 
equations estimated by the method at the top of the column. Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables for country and time specific effects. 29 
 
Table 4. OECD versus non-OECD countries 






 Equation 1  Win-Margin  Win-Margin  Win-Margin Win-Margin 
-0,501 a  -0,572 a       
Distortion in revenues 
(0,119)  (0,204)       
    0,359 a  0,739 a  Distortion in expenditures 
   (0,156) (0,121) 
-0,005 a  -0,034 a  -0,006 a  -0,029 a  Unemployment 
(0,001) (0,003)  (0,001)  (0,003) 
-0,726 a  -0,496 a  -0,783 a  -0,477 a  Inflation 
(0,048) (0,055)  (0,048)  (0,071) 
0,382 a  0,543 a  0,325 a  0,581 a  Win-Margin (previous 
election)  (0,018) (0,021)  (0,019)  (0,022) 
-0,021 a  -0,022 a  -0,027 a  -0,018 a  Years in incumbency 
(0,002) (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002) 
-0,059 a  -0,546 a  -0,044 a  -0,598 a  Re-election 
(0,011) (0,036)  (0,012)  (0,039) 
-1,816 a  -0,549 a  -2,019 a  -0,719 a  Government 
fractionalization  (0,083) (0,115)  (0,085)  (0,122) 
0,335 a  0,511 a  0,276 a  0,395 a  Fiscal illusion index 
(0,048) (0,064)  (0,069)  (0,048) 
Adjusted  R2  0.658  0.477 0.641 0.479 
Number of observations  150  100  150  100 








0,033 a  0,037 a  -0,049 a  -0,011 a 
Win.margin 
(0,012) (0,006)  (0,013)  (0,002) 
0,076 a  0,137 a        Public revenues share 
(0,003)  (0,007)       
    0,044 a  0,079 a  Public expenditures share 
   (0,004)  (0,006) 
0,007 c  0,013 b  0,008 c  0,019 c  Years in incumbency 
(0,004) (0,006)  (0,004)  (0,009) 
-0,059 a  0,016 b  0,017 a  0,024 a  Re-election 
(0,004) (0,007)  (0,004)  (0,007) 
0,028 a  0,043 a  -0,021 a  -0,007 b  Right-wing 
(0,003) (0,004)  (0,003)  (0,004) 
-0,007 a  -0,002 a  0,009 a  0.001  % population over 65 
years old  (0,001) (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
0,082 c  0,041 c  0,254 a  0,136 a  Real GDP per capita 
(0,042) (0,022)  (0,048)  (0,022) 
-0,111 a  -0,171 a  0,072 a  0,092 a  Fiscal illusion index 
(0,014) (0,014)  (0,016)  (0,013) 
Adjusted  R2  0.276  0.232 0.232 0.198 
Number of observations  150  100  150  100 
Notes: Significance level: 1% (a); 5% (b); 10% (c). Standard errors between parentheses. System of simultaneous 
equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models 
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